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responsibility of the authors.At least since 1930, empirical researchers have grappled with the
issue of whether investors immediately assimilate anticipated inflation
into required returns so that variations in nominal interest rates are
the best available predictors of variations in expected inflation.
Irving Fi sher and others demonstrated that pre-~4orld War II interest
rates responded slowly and incompletely to changes in inflation. But
Shiller and Fama derived strikingly contrasting results for postwar data
(particularly 1953-71): nominal interest rates (on average)
reflected anticipated inflation so that real interest rates were
independent of price changes. Fama argued that the contrast resulted
from an improved Consumer Price Index (CPI) in 1953 and that the tlGibson
par-adox" observed in prewar data arose from spurious autocorrelations
induced by a "nofsy'' price index.
The present study demonstrates that the differences between
Fisher's and Fama's results stem solely from Fama's selection of a
sample period--January 1953 to July 1971--of unprecedented price
stability in U.S. history. The famous theoretical "Fisher effect"
wherein interest rates correctly anticipate inflation -- holds during
Fama's period, and the result is robust with respect to price index
used, yield source, or type of short-term instrument studied. However,
in the period since April 1974 the economy has reverted to
characteristically higher price volatility, and empirical Fisherian
results are again apparent. Once again, evidence resoundingly rejects
the hypothesis that variations in nominal interest rates are appropriate
measures of variations in expected inflation.
Consequently, it appears that in general the theoretical "Fisher
effect" cannot be interpreted as a reduced-form equation for the
nominal interest rate. Evidence suggests that the interest rate isdetermined simultaneously by interaction of the commodity and financial
sectors, so an appropriate reduced~form equation must emanate from a
complete macroeconomic system. Furthermore, the reduced form must be
consistent with findings which corroborate a complete reflection of
anticipated inflation in nominal interest rates during periods of
relative price stability while generating the Gibson paradox during
periods of normal price volatility.
The results presented here are not necessarily inconsistent with
rational expectations (efficient markets). However, they reject rational
expectations in conjunction with a variety of maintained hypotheses
specified below.
-2-I. The Fisher equation as a reduced form
Under certainty, i.e., a deterministic macroeconomic system, an
investor holding claims denominated in money terms will demand a nominal
holding-period return
where Rt, rt, and TIt are the nominal rate of return, real rate of return
and inflation rate over [t, t+1]. The relationship between inflation
and nominal interest rates described by (1) is the famous Fisher
effect. 1
An "expectat i ons" version2 of the Fisher equation under
uncertainty is
with its consequent linear approximation
lThe equilibrium relationship was known prior to Fisher (see his
historical survey (1907, pp, 356-358)). However, (1) is commonly
ascribed to Fisher since he was the first to carry out extensive
statistical studies of the relationship.
2Ignoring risk-aversion is perhaps attributable to the belief that the
short holding periods (six months or less) in subsequent statistical
tests obviated the need to hedge against shifting investment
opportunities and that money market instruments generating tested
returns are (nearly) free of default risk.
-3-Assume inflation is initiated by exogenous shifts in the supply or
demand for money. Further assume -- as in most "classical 11
macroeconomic model s -- that money is "neutr-el": shocks to the monetary
system leave real variables unaffected. Classical neutrality results
require that relative prices be unchanged by the price level or
inflation. A key relative price is the expected real holding-period
return which is the opportunity cost of current goods, (1 + Rt)Pt,
relative to expected costs of future goods, P~+l' or
3)
which is merely a rearrangement of (2) with Cov(rt, ITt): 0 since other
real variables like rt are also independent of inflation. If the
security has no default risk, (3) and its linear approximation
3.) Rt " r~ + rr~
-4-become the reduced form equation 3 for the nominal interest rate.
Finally, introduce two maintained hypotheses. First, if
technology and tastes are stable through time, r~ can be replaced by a
constant, (arbitrarily called) Bo' Second, if investors have "rational
expectattons", they forecast inflation (or any other variable) utilizing
the minimum mean-square error estimator called the projection, ~t=
P(TItI0t), (or regression) of TIt onto the information set 0t. In
linear systems, the projection is the conditional expectation, ca1cu-
lated assuming investors know the probability distribution of the
exogenous variables and lagged endogenous variables comprising 0t
, 4
The rational expectations assumption is called the "efficient markets
hypothesi s" in the finance 1iterature and is interpreted to mean that
Uinvestors utilize all available information" in forecasting, where
"avai l able inforrnatton" then includes the "true" probability
distributions of variables in 0t.
3Sargent (1976) has noted that in some classical models, fiscal
variables affect both R t and ITt' so (3) is not a true reduced form
equation. However, inclusion ofa disturbance term Ct to capture such
omitted variables (Rt = rf + IIi + 0T) would also be lnappropriate since
Ct would not then be orthogonal to TIf.
4For further details of linear least squares projections, see Sargent
(1979), Ch. 10.
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N where {Bit}i=l may be any subset of 0t, and the 6i are parameters.
Then the forecast error €t
,
- ITt -ITt has the properties that
E(OtI0t) = 0 and E(OtOt_i lOt) = 0 for Vi > 0. 5 Consequently, under our
maintained hypotheses, (3a) may be written
Then the projection (regression) of inflation on any subset of G t may be
described with zero coefficients on everything except Rt and So·
Equation (5) represents the regression most statistical researchers
(including Fisher) have studied: project inflation onto a subset
{Sit} = u, Rt}. Its interpretation is the classic "Fisher eff ect": a
rise in anticipated inflation is fully reflected in the nominal interest
follows in the
and Rt ., IT. .
-1 -""t-l
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o for allrate, leaving the real rate unchanged. Hence (short-term) financial
instruments
l returns would provide the best available information about
expected inflation if empirical studies substantiate the theory.
Many macroeconomists remain skeptical of results derived from
"classtcal" precepts. However, Sargent (1973, 1976) has demonstrated
that the "Fisher effectII carries over to a (Keynesian) IS-LM framework
under a modification of our prior maintained hypotheses: the real rate
of interest will still be statistically independent of systematic shifts
in the money supply so that foreseen changes in monetary policy will
affect Rt only to the extent they alter rr~. This Fisherian result
requires that investors forecast according to the rational expectations
mechanism previously posited and that the Friedman-Phelps "natur-al rate"
hypothesis of employment holds so the a9gregate supply function is not
permanently affected by systematic monetary or fiscal policies.
Consider the following system of structural equations (aggregate
supply, aggregate demand (IS), and portfolio balance (LM),
respectively) :
a > 0
-7-where all variables are logarithms except the nominal interest rate
Rt. Variables Y t and Pt represent endogenous real income and the price
leve respectively. Zt' y~, p~, and m t are exogenous: they represent
fiscal variables, a measure of "natural output", price forecasts, and
the money supply, respectively. The vit are mutually uncorrelated (but
possibly serially correlated) random variables. Since prices are logs,
(p~-Pt) = II~ is an inflation forecast.
Note that the aggregate supply function is a (Lucas-type) version
of a Phillips curve allowing short-run deviation in output from the
natural rate due to errors in suppl i ers' price forecasts.
The system is completed by specifying the disturbances as auto-
regressive processes mixed with a zero mean
the money supply is governed by a linear feedback rule
.EW··v· t'+ jlJl,-J
and assuming
~it' i=1,2,3, j= 1,2,..., with
white noise (vit =
<it mutually uncorrel at ed )
defined as a mixture of autoregressive processes on the exogenous
variables m t, y~, Zt and the disturbances Vi' and an additional white
noise.
For this system the reduced-form equation for the nominal interest
rate is
+ q(l+a)cZt - q(l+albITt
-8-where q ~ [-lI(b+ab+ad)] > O.G The reduced-equation (9) is equivalent
to the regression (5) (the standard form of the Fisher equation) if the
coefficient of I\ equals one and the remaining terms can (on average) be
viewed as constants. Conversely, if empirical evidence suggests that
(5) holds, we can draw impl ications about parameters of the macro-
economic system required for the equivalence of (9) and (5).
For the coefficient of ITt to be (close to) one, either parameters
"a" or lid" (or both) must be (close to) zero. Thus the Phillips curve
must be vertical even in the short-run or the interest rate must be
determined solely ;n the commodity market. A vertical Phillips curve
might be observed empirically when price volatility is so low that
realizations rarely deviate from forecasts; a resultant empirical
estimate of (6) might imply a=O.
To interpret the terms other than inflation as (approximately)
constant in (9) requires that i) the disturbances· autoregressive
components be constant functions; ii) fiscal policy be stable; and iii)
investors maintain a constant relationship between the nominal interest
rate and the deviation of forecast real balances from the "natural"
level of output.
SUbstituting (6) into (8) and taking conditional expectations at
t-l reveals that
6In (9) and henceforth, the short-hand notation EtXt stands for
E(xt let) for any stochastic process xt•
-9-Equation (10) implies that any forecast change in the money supply is
reflected solely in changed expectations for the price level and the
nominal interest rate (plus altered expectations for an exogenous
variable and disturbance); there is no systematic effect on the real
interest rate. Furthermore, the anticipated relationship between real
balances and "natur-al" output is indeed reflected by a constant
proportional adjustment to the expected nominal rate (given the
disturbances' autoregressive components are constant).
Alternatively, taking conditional expectations of (g) at t-I and
subst itutinq from (10) shows that when suppliers make price forecasts an
appropriate regression for the nominal interest rate ;s
Hence under requirements (i) and (ii) above, investors' forecasts of
nominal rates will indeed be a linear combination of a constant and
their forecasts of inflation as (5) suggests.
Recapitulating, under rational expectations and either a
"classic al" or IS-LM-Phillips curve (neo-Keynesian) economy, a standard
interpretation of the "Fisher eff'ect" results: anticipated changes in
the money supply affect nominal interest rates only to the extent they
alter forecasts of inflation. Empirical substantiation of the standard
regression tested by most statistical researchers,
-10-5') TIt = So + SjRt + et
S.T. Pj=1
(with 130 the implied constant real rate) would lend credence to rational
expectations forecasts in conjunction with either a "e1ass ical " economy
and constant technology or a neD-Keynesian economy characterized by a
vertical long-run Phillips curve, stable fiscal policy, and a variety of
restrictions on the evolution of disturbances. Conversely, empirical
repudiation of (5') could be interpreted as absence of a stable
technology tn a "classical" economy or lack of a stable fiscal policy
or non-constant autoregressive disturbance functions in a neD-Keynesian
economy; it would not merit summary rejection of rational expectations.
However, it would clearly imply that variations in nominal interest
rates would not be accurate indicators of variations in expected
inflation. Furthermore, the failure of (51) would cast doubt on the
premise that "norni nal interest rates surrrrnarize all the information about
future inflation rates that is in time-series of past inflation
ratesv.? Verification of that hypothesis would require identification
of a reduced-form equation adequate to describe interaction of commodity
and monetary sectors to jointly determine Rt.
7Fama (1975), p. 269.
-11-r
II. Conflicting empirical results: Fisher versus Fama
A. Fisher's empirical "cont.radiction" of the theory
Fisher (1930) was the first to subject (3a) and (5) to rigorous
statistical testing. Analyzing data on short-and long-term interest
rates in Britain and the United States, Fisher found no corroboration
for the hypothesis that expected inflation ;s immediately and perfectly
reflected in variations of nominal interest rates. Fisherls results may
be characterized as follows:
1) Over long periods, R and IT moved together; however short-term
contemporanou5 correlations between R and IT were not high (some were
even negative). For example, decennial averages of R and II were highly
correlated but quarterly or annual averages were not.
2) Variations in R tended to be less than those in IT. Quoting
Fisher,
when prices are rising, the rate of interest
tends to be high but not so high as it should
be to compensate for the rise; and when prices
are falling, the rate of interest tends to be
low but not so low as it should be to compen-
sate for the fa'l.'
3) The influence of inflation seemed to be "dt str-tbut.ed over
time. Fisher found that correlations between R and distributed lags of
, Fisher (1930, p. 43).
-12-past inflation rates rose consistently with the number of lags. He
interpreted the finding to indicate "that interest rates follow price
changes closely in degree, though rather distantly in time". 9
Subsequent researchers have hypothesized that investors forecast
inflation by "adaptive expectattons", Then (3a) becomes
12)
Investigators like Sargent (1969), Yohe and Karnosky, and Gibson found
in tests of (12) that coefficients on past rates of inflation were
statistically significiant for very long lags; furthermore, the weights
summed to less than one. If prices are in logs (pt=log Pt) so
inflation can be defined as TIt=Pt+1-Pt' (12) can be rewritten as
(12' )
This is a statement of the Gibson paradox: the tendency of nominal
interest rates to be highly correlated with a time series of the price
level rather then the expected inflation rate. Sargent (1973) has
suggested how the Gibson paradox could arise in a stochastic macro-
economic system even if expectations are "rat iona1
11
• Cansequent'y,
empirical evidence supporting (12
1
) is insufficient to disprove rational
expectations (efficient markets). Conversely, any reduced form equation
'Ibid.• p. 451.
-13-for the nominal interest rate must be rich enough to explain the
empirical evidence for the Gibson paradox.
B. Fama and efficient markets
Using data from a different time period--January 1953 to July 1971-
-Fama (1975) claimed to find a very different set of facts. He
concluded that
...one •.•cannot reject the hypothesis that all
variation through time in one- to six-month
nominal rates of interest mirrors variation in
correctly assessed one- to six-month expected
rates of change in purchasing power... The
nominal interest rate R t ... is the best possible
predictor of inflation from t-l to t.
Fama chose his sample period for the following reasons: (i) the Federal
Reserve's bond support program during and after World War II prevented
interest rates from reflecting expected inflation; (ii) the Consumer
-14-Price Index (CPI) was "improved" in 1953;10 and (iii) price controls
from August 1971 to mid·1974 meant that "observed values of the CPI"
differed from the "true costs of goods to consumers" (Fama, 1975, p.
275) .
Rather than inflation (ITt), Fama defined the variable "purchasinq
power change" (lit) such that
_1
13) (l+ITt ) = (1+,\) .
Then appropriate restatements of (3a) and (5) are
10According to Fama, the "substantial upgrading of the CPI lIin 1953
was because the "number of items in the Index increased substantially,
and monthly sampling of major items become the general rule. For tests
of market efficiency based on monthly data, monthly sampling of major
items in the CPI is critical. Sampling items less frequently than
monthly... creates spurious autocorrelation in the Index," making tests
of "market efficiency on pre-1953 data difficult to fnter-pr-et ;" (Fama,
1975, p. 274).
While it is true that the numbers of items and sources sampled were
increased in 1953 (See BLS Bulletins 1948, p. 69, and 1711, p. 75), we
have been able to find no reference to an increase in the frequency of
sampling at that time. In fact, the frequency of sampling since 1953,
and indeed since 1948, has probably been considerably less than between
1940 and 1948. IIA reduction of one-third in appropriations for fiscal
year 1948 necessitated changes in the frequency of pricing for nonfood
items and in the number of items currently priced" (BLS, Bulletin 1517,
p. 4; also see Bulletin 965, pp. 35-36). Since that time, most nonfood
items have been sampled every month only in the five largest urban areas
and once every three months in other areas. Several items are sampled
only semiannually or annually.
This does not mean that Fama was wrong to begin with 1953, for the
Federal Reserve1s bond support program during and after World War !I
prevented interest rates from reflecting expected inflation. But lt
does suggest that he may have exaggerated the superiority of the post-
1952 years as the appropriate sample for tests of market efficiency.
And his emphasis on the importance of sampling frequency lends support
to use of the WPI, where most items really are sampled monthly.
-15-14)
15) '.=~-R+E
" 0 t t
where £t is orthogonal to the constant real rate B o and nominal rate Rt ,
Equation (15) may be tested by the OLS regression
16)
where we expect al = -1. From the properties of the forecast error for
* the projection developed earlier, £t (and hence €t) should contain no
serial correlation. Furthermore, combining (14) and (15) shows
17) r t - ~o = Et
so autocorrelations of the time series of realized real rates have the
properties of the forecast error; hence autocorrelations of rt should be
zero for all lags. Finally, if Etllt = ~o - EtRt is the projection of lit
onto 0t, then the addition of IIt_1
E 0t to the right hand side of (15)
should result in a2 = 0 when testing the OLS regression
Using price data from Salomon Brothers' daily release for one- to
six-month Treasury bills, selecting bills maturing closest to monthls
end, and employing the revised CPI, Fama calculated time series for
-16-'t' Rt, and rt to test the OLS regressions (16) and (18) and autocor-
relations of the time series (toll When maturity exceeded one month.
non-overlapping data were selected to avoid introducing spurious auto-
correlation.
For his sample period, Fama discovered that dutocorrelations of the
the real rate were indeed zero for all lags, al was close to -1 as
predicted by theory, and u2 (the coefficient of purchasing power change
lagged one period) was insignificantly different from zero. 12 He
concluded that variations in nominal interest rates were the best
available predictors of inflation: current market values appeared to
incorporate all information available in time series of lagged
purchasing power change (inflation).
Fama explained the contrast of his results with his predecessors'
findings by noting that' 3
.•.earlier studies... are based primarily on pre-
1953 data. and the negative results on market
efficiency may to a large extent just reflect poor
commodity price data. By the same token. the
Success of the tests reported here is probably to a
non-negligible extent a consequence of the
availability of good data beginning in 1953.
llAlthough theory has been developed in terms of linear
approximations like (3a), the time series rt was calculated from the
precise relationship rt = (l+Rt)(l+'t) - 1.
12Numerical highlights of Fama's findings appear in the next section for
contrast.
13Shiller obtained results similar to Fama's on postwar data.
-17-He further hypothesized that the Gibson paradox prevalent in data prior
to 1953 resulted from poor price data (a "noisy" price index) obscuring
the Fisher effect by spurious autocorrelation while picking up long-
run price movements. 14
III. A return to Fishter's world: evidence conflicting with theory
Sufficient time has elapsed since the end of the price controls in
April 1974 to test Fama's hypotheses outside his sample per-tod.Jf
Unfortunately~ it appears that postwar years (particulary 1953-71) were
not earmarked by improved data collection or a public more highly
attuned to the costs of inflation. Rather~ Fama's results stem from
the selection of a sample period of price placidity unparalleled during
the twentieth century. Perusal of Charts 1 and 2 indicates that
1953-71 was a period of such price tranquility that even the most ardent
foes of rational expectations should not react incredulously to
assertions that agents acted as though they knew the underlying
14sargent (1976) agreed with Fama that a break in data behavior
apparently occurred near World War II: postwar tests seemed to support
a rational expectations hypothesis. However, Sargent suggested that any
conclusions would be speculative in the absence of a verifiable theory
for the Gibson paradox in prewar data.
15Sector-by-sector decontrol began October 25, 1973, so when the
Economic Stabilization Act expired in April 1974 less than one-fourth of
the economy was subject to controls. Thus we would not expect any
sudden rise in prices in May 1974 due to a "buil d-up" effect. For
further details, see Department of the Treasury~ Historical Working Paper
on the Economic Stabilization Program: 8/15/71-4/30/74~ Office
of Economic Stabi1ization. In any case, what matters to the theory is
prediction of price movements~ whatever the cause~ whether due to the
ending of controls or not.
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..probability distribution of the price level during the era. Chart 1
shows 5-month observations on the 4-6 month prime commercial paper rate
(R, the fairly steady solid line), the rate of change in the Wholesale
Price Index (n, the volatile solid line), and R-n (the dashed line)
between 1894 and 1981. Chart 2 displays 3-month observations on the 3-
month Treasury bill rate and the CPI from 1929 to 1982.16
During the 1953-71 period of low price volatility, the rational
expectations "Ftsher eff ect" model is easily corroborable. The result
is hi9hly robust and apparently independent of i) the source of yield
data; ii) the price index used (CPI or WPI); and iii) the type of
short-term instrument (Treasury bill or commercial paper) generating the
nominal rate series~ However, in periods characterized by higher price
volatility (viz. prior to 1953 or subsequent to the recent removal of
price controls, i.e., 4/74-present), regression tests
of (16) and (18) and autocorrelation tests on the real ized real rate
series soundly reject rational expectations in conjunction with the
maintained hypotheses described earlier.
Table 1 presents a comparison of sample autocorrelations for three-
month real rates during Fama1s sample period. The time-series for rt
generating the autocorrelations were calculated using the CPI and three
data sources: i) Fama's data supplied from Salomon Brothers' daily
quote sheets for the bill maturing closest to month's end; ii) data
160ata for the 4-6 month prime commercial paper rate and the 3-month
Treasury bill rate first became available in 1894 and 1929,
respectively.
-19-Table 1
Comparison of sample autocorrelations on
three-month real rates (1/53-4/71)
calculated from the cpr and three data
sources: 1) Fama's data supplied from Salomon
Bros. quote sheets (last day of the month); 2)
Salomon Bros. Yield Book*; 3) Federal Reserve
Board averages (non-overlapping data).
Table 2
Sample Autocorrelations on Five-Month Real Rates
4-6 Month Commercial Paper and the WPI (Non-Overlappin9 Data
Statistic/ (1) (2) (3) Statistic/
Source Fama SBYB FRB Per;ad 8/94-3/29 8/29-12/52 2/53-6/71 5/53-9/1
.00 .04 .03 • .43** .60** .10 .49**
~l ~,
~2 .02 -.14 -.17 ~2 .02 .35 .25 .30
£3 .08 .16 .17 ~3 -.14 .18 .01 .20
£. .26 .23 .23 ~4 -.11 .05 .08 .05
~s .16 .09 .09 ~s - .02 -.08 .08 -.08
~6 -.09 -.08 -.08 ~6 .09 -.14 .01 -.03
~7 .06 .01 -.00 P7 .11 -.12 .10 -.04
-.01 •18 .21 • -.08 -.10 .21 -.09 £8 P8
£9 .08 -.14 -.15 ~9 - .29 -.10 .10 -.06
P,o -.32 -.23 -.21 ~10 -.24 -.02 -.16 .06
all .11 .06 .09 ~ll -.14 -.00 -.12 -.01
• .19 .19 .19 ~12 -.12 .05 -.23 .11
PI 2
a ~,) .12 .12 .12 o ~l) .11 .13 .15 .12
rH .00306 .00313 .00307 r'*"** .01501 -.00261 .01154 .0065:
s(r) .00371 .00400 .00400 s(r) .07051 .05010 .00966 .0193:
T-1 73 73 73 T-1 83 56 44 68
*The Yield Book reported a quote on the mid-day
of the month prior to 1964 and on the first day
of the month subsequently. Tests indicate that
real rate series calculated before and after
the reporting change were indistinguishable.
**On a three-month (rather than annual) basis.
*Due to use of non-overl apping data, there are 5 sets of data for ever.
time period, each starting in a different month. Thi~ set was chosen
random and is representative. The hi~hest estimator Pl for the 1953-7
period in alternative sets was 0.27 w ich is still statistically
insignificant at the 0.95 confidence level.
**Statistically different from zero at the 0.95 confidence level.
***On a five-month (rather than annual) basis.from Salomon Brothers· Yield Book which reported a quote on the mid-day
of the month prior to 1964 and the first day of the month subsequently;
and iii) Federal Reserve Board data, reported as monthly averages of
daily quotes. Non-overlapping data were utilized throughout the study
to avoid introducing spurious autocorrelations. Note that the sample
autocorrelation series for twelve lags are nearly indistinguishable in
magnitude and sign pattern regardless of data source.
Table 2 displays sample autocorrelations on five-month real rates
generated from 4-6 month prime commercial paper and the WPI. Hence the
instrument used is not totally riskless (in the sense of default risk)
and the price index is more volatile than the CPl. Note that in each
historical period except Fama·s 1953-71 subperiod, first-order
autocorrelation coefficients are significantly different from zero,
violating the theory.
Table 3 extends the evidence that Fama·s conclusions result from
the sample period selected rather than removal of noise from the price
index. It depicts sample autocorrelations on three-month real rates
generated from Federal Reserve Board average yields and, alternatively,
the CPI or WPI, over three sample periods: pre-Fama, Fama, and post-
Fama. As anticipated, autocorrelations are close to zero for all lags
during the Fama period regardless of the price index used to generate
the real rate time series. In both pre- and post-Fama periods, first-
order autocorrelation estimates are significantly different from zero at
the 0.95 confidence level.
-20-Table 3
COMPARING SAMPLE AUTOCORRELATIONS ON THREE-MONTH REAL RATES OVER THREE PERIOOS
3-MONTH T-BILLS (FEOERAL RESERVE AVERAGES) WITH THE CPI OR WPI ( NON-OVERLAPPING OATA)*
1/34 - 10/52 1/53 - 4/71** 4/74 - 10/81
Statistic/
Data Source# FRB(CPI) FRB( WPI) FRB(CPI) FRB(WPI) FRB(CPI) FRB( WPI)
,
.52*** .60*** .03 .01 .40*** .48*** gl
~2 .34 .30 -.17 .31 .21 .02
g3 .23 .08 .17 -.00 .32 .09
~4 .08 -.06 .23 .IB .12 .14
~s .06 -.03 .09 -.07 .02 -.08
~6 -.08 -.09 -.08 .09 -.02 -.04
g, -.17 -.19 -.00 .05 -.II -.04
~B -.17 -.16 .21 .14 - .10 -.IB
~9 -.26 -.16 -.15 -.04 -.15 -.22
~lO -.24 -.14 -.21 .07 -.II .00
~ll -.22 -.17 .09 .09 -.06 -.02
P1 2 -.19 -.17 .19 .15 .02 -.18
a ~l) .12 .12 .12 .12 .18 .18
rUi -.00807 -.00943 .00307 .00510 -.00032 -.00007
s(r) .01501 .02703 .00400 .00631 .00939 .01593
T-I 75 75 73 73 30 30
*Due to use of non-overlapping data, there are three data sets for every time period, each starting in a
different month. This set was chosen at random and is representative. The highest estimators PI for the
1953-71 period in alternative sets were 0.18 and 0.11 for the CPI and WPI respectively; neither is signi-
ficantly different from zero at the 0.95 confidence level.
**Note the 4/71 observation uses the 7/71 price level.
***Statistically different from zero at the 0.95 confidence level.
·ffThe data legends stand for "Federal Reserve Board" averages with the Consumer Price Index (FRB(CPI)) and
with the Wholesale Price Index (FRB(WPI)). Federal Reserve Board data are monthly averages of daily quotes.
## On a three-month (rather than annual) basis.These results are duplicated in Table 4 for one-month real rates
generated from Salomon Brothers' Yield Book quotes and either the CPI or
WPI in Fama and post-Fama settings. Fama1s sample autocorrelations are
included for comparison. Once again, the data source or price index
used is immaterial between 1953-71; the "ef'f i cient markets" hypothesis
is upheld even if the price index is the WPI. However, in the 4/74-9/81
period, the same hypothesis is rejected. Combining the results of
Tables 1-4 supports our previous conclusions about the robustness of the
"efficient markets" hypothesis during the 1953-71 sample period and its
complete failure elsewhere.
For those unconvinced by autocorrelation tests, the results of
regressions (16) and (18) are reported in Table 5 for one-month Treasury
bills (quotes from Salomon Brothers' Yield Book) and the CPI during
Fama1s period, the period subsequent to removal of price controls, and
the two periods jointly. Table 6 displays corresponding outcomes for
the WPI. Fama's regression results are reproduced for contrast since
his data source for bond yields is slightly different from ours.
Once again, our results duplicate Fama's during the 1953-71 sample
period. However, for the period 4/74-9/81, corroboration of the
"effic i ent markets" hypothesis fails: the coefficient on the nominal
interest rate is not close to -1.0 and the first three sample
autocorrelation coefficients for the residuals are significantly
different from zero at the 0.95 confidence level. Seriously
autocorrelated residuals appear in the combined sample period 1/53-9/81
(excluding price contrOls), although the coefficient of R t is again
close to -1.0.
-21-TABLE 4
Comparing Sample Autocorrelations on One-Month Real Rates Over Two Periods
I-Month T-Bi11 s (Salomon Bros. Yield Book) with the CPI or WPI
1/53 - 6/71 4/74 -9/81
Statistic
Source FAMA(CPI)* SBYB( CPI) SBYB(WPI) SBYB(CPI) S8YB( WPI)
· .09 .10 .01 .40** .35** PI
· .13 .13 .09 .30 .10 P2
· -.02 -.03 -.n .24 .23 P3
· -.01 -.01 .10 .14 -.n p.
· -.02 -.03 -.05 .07 -.05 Ps
• -.02 -.03 .18 .05 .02 P6
• -.07 -.07 .03 .05 -.18 P7
• .04 .03 .13 .13 -.04 P8
· .n .n -.08 .13 .15 P9
PIa .10 .09 .06 .09 .01
· .03 .03 -.01 .13 .10 Pn
· .19 .18 .13 .08 .18 P12
o( "1) .07 .07 .07 .n .n
r*** .00074 .00086 .00154 -.00074 -.00069
s(r) .00197 .00194 .00353 .00301 .00732
T-1 222 221 221 89 89
*Fa~a's results, which include 7/71, are reproduced here for comparison. We have omitted the 7/71
observation since it requires the price index in 8/71 when price controls had been instituted.
**Significantly different from zero at the 0.95 confidence level.




REGRESSION TESTS ON ONE-MONTH BILLS
(The Price Index for Calculating at Is the CPl.)
Simple Regression
6t
=' ao + a1Rt + et
t-value aj t-value R2 s(e) "j(e) "2(e) P3(e) obs. ._-
2.39 - .942 -9.76 .301 .0019 .094 .125 -.031 223
-4.66 -.557 -5.12 .230 .0028 .382* .273* .212* 90







Fama IS resu ltU
(1/53-7/71) .0007 2.33 -.98 -9.8 .29 .0020 .09 .13 -.02 223
Multiple Regression





t-value aj t-value . a2 t-value
1.98 -.843 -7.60 .092 1.43
-2.90 -.247 -2.03 .468 4.42
1.20 -.647 -8.45 .360 6.59




























*Note that o(Pt) • 117(T-t) under the hypothesis that the true autocorrelation coefficient is zero. See
Ne1son (pp. 71-74) for a more precise approximation us;nq Bart1ett I s method. Under either method with a 95%
confidence statistic, we reject the hypothesis that residuals are not autocorrelated in the simple regression.
Addition of a lagged dependent variable adds significant explanatory power and eliminates autocorrelation in
the residuals.
#Fama's results are included for comparison since his data source is different.
of freedom. Note our regression results are nearly coincident with Fama1s over
expected.
His R2 is adjusted for
the 1953-71 period as
degreesTABLE 6
REGRESSION TESTS ON ONE-MONTH BILLS
(The Price Index for Calculating 't Is the WPI.)
Simple Regression
l!.t = ao + a1Rt + et
Period ao t-value a, t-value R2 s(e) p, (e) ;'2(e) ;'3(e) obs.
1/53-7/71 .0003 .63 - .565 -3.25 .046 .0035 -.018 .075 - .133 223
4/74-9/81 -.0054 -2.71 -.288 -1.04 .012 .0070 .316* .104 .282* 90




't = ao + alRt + a2l!.t_l + et
Period ao t-value a1 t-value a2 t.-value R2 s(e) "1(e) "2(e) "3(e) obs.
1/53-7/71 .0003 .58 -.570 -3.17 -.0194 -.29 .045 .0035 .006 .066 -.126 222
4/74-9/81 -.0041 -2.05 -.196 -.73 .2696 2.71 .089 .0068 .042 -.006 .360* 90
1/53-9/81 .0005 1.03 -.725 -6.02 .2346 4.29 .237 .0049 -.003 .078 .151* 312
(excluding
8/71-3/74)
*Note that a(~t} ~ II!(T-t) under the hypothesis that the true autocorrelation coefficient is zero. See
Nelson (pp. 71-74) for a more precise approximation using Bartlett's method. Under either method with a 95%
confidence statistic, we reject the hypothesis that residuals are not autocorrelated in the simple regression.
Addition of a lagged dependent variable adds significant explanatory power and eliminates autocorrelation in
the residuals.The addition of a single lagged purchasing-power explanatory
variable, 6t_1, transforms the simple regression (16) to the multiple
regression (18). During Fama's period, the coefficient of 6t_1 is not
significantly different from zero, further corroborating the "effic i ent
markets" hypothest s i l? However, during the post-Fama period and the
joint period 1/53-9/81 (excludin9 price controls), the coefficient of
6t_1 is relatively large, significantly different from zero, and adds a
large amount of explanatory power to the regressions. Furthermore, the
residual sample autocorrelations are close to zero.iS Consequently,
variations in nominal interest rates are clearly acceptable as "best"
predictors of forecast inflation durin9 the period 1/1953-7/1971 but
fail from 4/1974-9/1981 (and from 1/53-9/81 with the price control
subset excluded).19 Table 6 shows analogous results when the price
17However , Nelson and Schwert found that a Box-Jenkins distributed
la9 on inflation (in place of Fama's '\-1) improved the R2 sl i qhtly
(from .29 to .31) and was statistically si9nificant.
i8This should not be surprising since the residuals in the sample
regression (16) are autocorrelated during post-Fama and joint periods.
Assuming an AR(l) process for the errors, multiple regression (18) is
hi9hly anal090us to a generalized (first) difference re9ression of (16).
The lack of autocorrelation is important in the presence of a lagged
dependent variable because we can then claim our parameter estimates are
unbiased and consistent.
19For statistical purists, an F-test can be constructed to test whether
parameters in the multiple regression (18) come from the same population
durin9 the 1/53-7/71 and 4/74-9/81 periods. The null hypothesis is
H o : ~ = apF
where ~ and BP.F are the parameter vectors in the Fama and post-
Fama period regressions respectively. It is rejected if the F-statistic
from the regression (F*) exceeds the critical value F(l-a; R, N-K) where
(I-a) is the confidence level, R the number of restrictions, and N-K the
degrees of freedom. For the multiple regression reported in Table 5, F*
= 14.86 ~ Fcv(.99, 3, 306) ~ 3.8 so we can safely reject the hypothesis
that the two are similar.
-22-index is the WPI. The major difference between the WPI and CPI
regressions is the lower explanatory power of the WPI.
IV. Conclusions
It is evident that in general, variations in nominal interest rates
are not appropriate measures of variations in expected inflatiJn. The
classical "Fisher effect" equation is inadequate to describe the
intricate interactions between financial and commodity sectors in
determining the interest rate. The Gibson paradox observed in pre-World
War II data does not stem from "noi sy" commodity price data; it
reappears with the resurgence of sustained higher levels of price
volatility as suggested by Charts 1 and 2. Inflation forecasts can
evidently only be inferred from a non-classical reduced-form equation.
It is relatively easy to argue that (g) or an equation implied by
the linear least-squares projection (11) might fit the data for both
periods 1/53-7/71 and 4/74-9/81. During the earlier period, fiscal
policy was relatively stable; furthermore, price volatility was
sufficiently low that one might argue price forecasts differed from
realizations too little to generate even short-run systematic deviations
from "natural" output. With the resurrection of greater price
volatility and more erratic fiscal policy in the 4/74-9/81 period,
several maintained hypotheses could be violated, resulting in the
failure of (9) (or its analogue implied by (11)) to collapse to the
classical Fisher equation; nevertheless, expectations could still be
-23-formed rationally. Thus a system with a non-constant real rate (where
we interpret the ureal rate" as the sum of all terms in a reduced form
equation like (9) other than the inflation term) is broadly consistent
with rational expectations (efficient markets).
Much recent empirical work on the relationship between interest
rates and inflation has focused on this implied non-constancy of the
real rate. For example, Tanzi, Cargill and Meyer, Fama and Gibbons,
Mishkin, and Startz have estimated equations of the Fisher-Fama type
using a variety of distributed lag schemes (intended to capture
inflationary expectations) and real variables (presumed to influence the
real rate of interest) and most have concluded that the real rate is not
constant. Essentially the same result has been obtained within multi-
equation, macroeconomic frameworks by Elliott and Shiller and Siegel.
All of these studies except the last assume, with Fisher and Fama, that
money is both exogenous and the primary source of the inflationary
process, i.e., that inflations are precipitated by exogenous monetary
disturbances. Thus, these studies are consistent with the assumed
exogeneity of money in the macroeconomic system (6)-(8) which led to the
reduced form (9).
Clearly, however, other macro systems, price forecasting
mechanisms, and monetary endogeneity, would lead to alternative feasible
reduced-form equations. Another explanation of the data reported above
might emanate from a model completed by i) endogenizing the behavior of
the central bank and therefore of the money suppply and ii) making
explicit the causal connections between the real rate of interest and
other real variables. Such a model is best described as Wicksellian,
-24-in which i) disturbances emanate from the real side of the economy
through forces affecting supplies and demands for goods, the most
important of which may be categorized under the headings "savings" and
Uinvestment"; ii) these disturbances affect the equilibri urn real rate
of interest (Wicksell's natural rate); and iii) a monetary authority
fond of stable interest rates resists the adjustment of the market rate
to the natural rate, iv) thereby accentuating the price changes induced
by the initiating real disturbances.zu This approach, which must take
disequilibria into account, could explain the strong, long-term
tendencies of money, inflation, nominal interest rates, and real
investment and/or government expenditures (as the most volatile real
variables in the system) to vary together. However, since nominal
interest rates vary less than inflation, partly due to the central
bank's resistance, real interest rates move oppositely to these
variables. The high autocorrelations observed in expost real rates are
thus broadly consistent with Wicksell's analysis.
ZUShiller and Siegel rejected their version of Wicksell1s model but
their tests treated high-powered money as exogenous. However, they
admitted the possibility "that central bank behavior, in attempting to
a~tenuate interest rate changes, will result in a correlation between
hlgh-powered money and interest rates and hence give rise to the Gibson
Par-adox" •
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